In October – especially from the second half of the
month –, the agenda was determined by the international financial crisis. As a
result of this trauma, the outlines of Hungarian party politics, rooted in the
Balatonőszöd speech, became blurred; something the MSZP – lead by an extremely
active Ferenc Gyurcsány – tried to turn to its advantage. The Fidesz, after
some early hesitation, attacked both the credibility and the economic policies
of the government.
The political agenda rarely changes as much in a month as it did in
October 2008. From the second week of the month, news was almost exclusively
about the international financial crisis – and its Hungarian aspects –,
overshadowing or transforming the previously dominant issues. The crisis has
shaken the world from the United States to Asia, leaving Hungarian politics
with an external factor that the parties had to adapt to. The situation was
like in September 2006, after Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány’s notorious
Balatonőszöd speech was leaked. As a result of the trauma, the existing
outlines of politics became blurred. It would be too early to suggest that a
paradigm shift has taken place, but the parties were surely presented with a
chance to reposition themselves. The situation came in handy especially for the
unpopular governing party and the Prime Minister. This led to Ferenc Gyurcsány and the socialist party deciding to take the lead in the apparently unavoidable crisis management. In the second half of October, the Prime
Minister was reminiscent of his old self, the one before 2006. Up till now, the
Fidesz has kept emphasizing that the country was in crisis. Now that this has
become common knowledge, but the problems could not easily be blamed on the
government’s incompetence, the largest opposition party struggled to find a
new, effective message. Of further concern was that the MSZP repeatedly called for
cooperation in consideration of the grave situation, which was hard to reject,
but contrary to the Fidesz’s long-term interests. The crisis has had a mixed
effect on the smaller parties: they always played a role at the various
financial crisis meetings, but usually a minor one. Although the economic
difficulties gave added importance to the SZDSZ’s “budget spending ceiling”, it
remains a question whether the bill will really be perceived as the free
democrats’ merit.
The crisis – at least so far – has been more favourable to the
government. This is reflected by Graph 1: the ratio of government topics has
significantly increased, while that of the topics of the opposition has stayed
at its low September level. Their difference has not been this large since the
referendum in March – when the opposition held such an advantage. The last time
the government was ahead this much was more than a year ago, in August 2007,
after the formation of the Hungarian Guards. Both the MSZP and the Fidesz had
more appearances than in the previous month (Graph 2). The socialists’
performance is a record in this parliamentary term, and would have been
considered outstanding in the previous one, too. The SZDSZ and the MDF could
not perform as well as in September, although the latter remained more active
than usual. The reason for the small parties’ fall-back is that the issues that
had kept them in the limelight – such as the fate of the budget or the MDF’s
internal power struggles – disappeared from the agenda.
In the first two weeks of October, and later amongst news about the
economic crisis, several issues arose that, in an average month, would have
determined the agenda. It is worth noting that the key issues of the autumn so
far were not among them. Only a single parliamentary debate was held on Ferenc
Gyurcsány’s Agreement program (07.
10.) and the surveillance affair lost its place on the front pages as well.
Although both large parties continued to deal with it, they did so through
second-rate politicians. Apart from them, SZDSZ’s József Gulyás was also trying
to shape the scandal’s afterlife; he requested the position of the
newly-appointed data protection ombudsman on the matter (01. 10.), and proposed
the establishment of a parliamentary fact-finding committee (02. 10.). The
MDF’s problems were not over: the very existence of the party’s parliamentary
group was put into jeopardy after János Vas – following the wishes of the
Society of Respect (Tisztelet Társasága), the organization that had delegated
him – decided to leave it (10. 10.). In order to ensure the required number of
ten MPs, the conservatives had to bring in independent Zoltán Lengyel (13.
10.), who had been forced to leave the ranks of the Fidesz because of a
personal scandal. After a train accident claiming several lives, Minister of
Transport Pál Szabó resigned (06. 10.); however, he is still in charge of the
ministry, as his successor has not yet been found. Part of the month’s
chronicle is that this time, the 23rd October commemorations ended
without much to mention: the Fidesz – unlike in the previous two years – did
not have any concrete purpose with the event, while the radical demonstrators
could not surprise the well-prepared police.
The international financial crisis came as no surprise to the Hungarian
political elite, but its probable effects on the country were unclear. This
uncertainty was mirrored by the government’s first, occasionally controversial
statements about the situation in Hungary. In the beginning, it was
claimed that the country would not be affected by the primary consequences of
the crisis (06. 10.), but soon afterwards, it turned out that the Hungarian
banking system was indeed dependent on the global financial processes (10.
10.). At the same time, the national currency, the forint started to weaken and
the Budapest Stock Exchange went downhill. This led to Ferenc Gyurcsány and the
socialist party taking the lead in the apparently unavoidable crisis
management. The Prime Minister held a meeting with the leaders of the
parliamentary groups, in which he presented a 12-point package (10. 10.); then,
on the extraordinary congress of the MSZP, he proposed a national summit with
the participation of the political and economic elite (11. 10.). Even
opposition leader Viktor Orbán was present at this event (18. 10.). For the
socialists, the crisis has become a sort of vis major, an always applicable
ultimate argument, which left the party and the Prime Minister with a chance to
reposition themselves. Exploiting the crisis atmosphere, the MSZP endeavoured
to appear a dynamic, competent party, which, in the grave situation, would even
cooperate with its rivals. This message was reinforced by symbolic measures:
Ferenc Gyurcsány postponed some of his foreign trips, and announced that the
salaries of the government members would not increase in 2009 (22. 10.). The
Fidesz could not continue to neglect the Prime Minister, so, thanks to the
various meetings he has regained some of his legitimacy. Another probable
purpose of the five-party talks was for Ferenc Gyurcsány to share the
responsibility for the expected unpopular steps in advance. Furthermore, the
crisis proved to be a trump card in policy debates as well. The cabinet used it
to justify its decision to put off tax cuts and freeze real wages. In
consideration of the new circumstances, the government withdrew the budget
proposal it had submitted in late September, so that a new version could be
made, based this time on more realistic macroeconomic numbers (13. 10.).
Throughout this parliamentary term, the Fidesz kept building on the
notion that the country was in crisis – be it of legitimacy, political, social
or economic. That is paradoxically why the opposition party has found itself
one step behind the government: it was unable to update its messages. Another
concern was that the socialists used every opportunity to press for cooperation
and a truce in party politics. The Fidesz had to decide whether to comply with
this presumably popular request, falling into line, or go on with its
confrontational politics. In the end, the right-wing party chose the second
option, having realized that – in spite of the temporary drawbacks – it might
eventually prove to be the more profitable one. In the following period,
voters, finding it more difficult to make ends meet, will be looking for
answers to two fundamental questions: who is to blame for the crisis, and how
efficient was the government’s reaction to it. Bearing this in mind, the Right
has emphasized that – although the crisis was global – the situation in Hungary
was especially grave because of the government’s bad economic policies. The Fidesz
called the cabinet’s present measures late and inadequate. They argued that the
basis of the economic crisis was a leadership crisis, rooted in the
government’s lack of credibility, and its subordination of everything to Ferenc
Gyurcsány’s political survival. The opposition party came up with its own set
of proposals, built on tax cuts, which it contrasted with the government’s
steps, branded as a “belt-tightening” package (10. 10.). Thus on one hand, the
Fidesz tried to prevent the MSZP and the Prime Minister from repositioning
themselves, and on the other hand, they prepared for the period when people
will be feeling the effects of the crisis in their everyday lives.
This time, the list of politicians who have appeared on the agenda is
really telling (Graph 3). It is headed by the Prime Minister, the opposition
leader, the Minister of Finance and the Fidesz’s economic expert, whose names
and level of activity would alone suggest that in October, there was a major
economic issue on the agenda. The politicians on the list have almost all
played a role in the discourse about the crisis. Speaking of the SZDSZ, it is worth
mentioning that five-party talks were held about the 'budget spending ceiling', the policy proposal the free democrats emphasized the most (22. 10.).
President László Sólyom is again on the list – he received a lot of media
attention when he turned down Ferenc Gyurcsány’s invitation to the national
summit (14. 10.). In October, both the Prime Minister and the leader of the
opposition performed significantly better than in the previous month (Graph 4).
The Prime Minister was able to improve his already good September performance,
so overall, this was one of the busiest months of his career. Viktor Orbán was
not exceptionally active, in spite of having had more appearances than usual.
The difference between their respective values has not been this large for
three years.
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