The economic crisis remained leading news, but it did not dominate the agenda as much as in October. The government still endeavoured to reap the political benefits of managing the crisis, while the Fidesz stepped up its attacks. Another important part of the agenda was a conflict between Hungary and Slovakia, which provided Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány with a new opportunity to improve his image.
The international financial crisis has continued to headline Hungarian politics in November. The agenda was strongly influenced by news about the economy, to which the parties and politicians had to react. However, as the idea of being in a crisis lost its novelty, the crisis atmosphere has started to subside, even though several aspects of the future remain uncertain. By then, the parties had enough time to adapt to the new situation, thus they became more focused than in October. The change was particularly conspicuous for the Fidesz: the opposition party led a series of strong and concentrated attacks against the cabinet, although it apparently did not always use the most effective messages. The MSZP was quite rational in its handling of the crisis from the beginning, so the governing party did not have to make big adjustments. On the other hand, it was a huge surprise that Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány has started to speak about the necessity of reforms again. This time, there was room on the agenda for issues other than the crisis management. On the 1st November, the Slovak police was unusually harsh in its handling of a group of radical football fans from Hungary, who appeared at a local match. This resulted in a new conflict in the anyway strained relationship of the two countries. The incident left Ferenc Gyurcsány with an opportunity somewhat similar to the economic crisis: there was an undeniable external problem – Slovak nationalism –, against which he could take firm steps, and emphasize at the same time the need for cooperation between the five Hungarian parties. The Fidesz was in a tricky situation again, because it had to accept the Prime Minister as a legitimate partner, and could only criticize him with moderation. It is worth mentioning that the 2009 budget and tax changes seem to be on track. The former will be approved by the SZDSZ, the latter by the MDF, as the socialists made some concessions to both parties. This is a great success for the MSZP – and personally Ferenc Gyurcsány –, but raises questions about the opposition status of the small parties.
The ratio of government topics has slightly decreased, while that of the topics of the opposition has somewhat improved (Graph 1). Overall, their difference has diminished, but is still considerable. The government has been ahead since the referendum in March, for eight consecutive months in a row now. It is therefore telling, and may be a justification of the Fidesz’s strategy, that the relative popularity of the two sides – that is, the huge advantage of the opposition – has barely changed in the same period. The MSZP was the most active of the parties, with an outstanding result like in October (Graph 2). However, as the Fidesz managed to improve its performance, the gap between the two parties has narrowed. The small parties – with just a few exceptions - were once again constrained to minor roles.
The framework of politics was still determined by the economic realities. In November, the effects of the crisis have reached Hungary. The growth of industrial output has slowed down, many people lost their jobs and all the major credit rating agencies have downgraded the country. Moreover, prognoses about the worsening economic prospects followed one another. In this situation, it was the cabinet’s responsibility to work out and implement concrete steps to manage the crisis. The government asked for and received help from the International Monetary Fund and the European Union; together, the two institutions approved a 25 billion dollar stand-by credit for the country (29. 10.). Ferenc Gyurcsány claimed that in order to meet the IMF’s expectations, expenditure cuts worth HUF 300 billion were required, partly at the expense of the 13th month pension and 13th month bonuses in the public sector (27. 10.). The budget needed to be modified again, this time by means of amendments to the bill (31. 10.). The government announced a HUF 600 billion aid package for banks (06. 11.), and later a 1400 billion worth subsidy for companies, mostly from EU funds (13. 11.). Symbolic measures were also taken: half of the state enterprise leaders’ bonuses was regrouped to finance job creation (18. 11.) and the parties agreed to put a tax on the MPs’ defrayal (25. 11.).
Besides managing the crisis, the MSZP could continue to reposition itself. As the party’s initial attempts were adequate, neither the means nor the messages needed to be changed in November. Ferenc Gyurcsány proposed several five-party talks in order to appear a dynamic leader, increase his and his government’s legitimacy and to share the responsibility for the unpopular steps. This last consideration gained significance in light of the IMF’s tough expectations: the Prime Minister wanted to know which of these the parties agreed with (28. 10.). Later, he convened an economic summit, for the political and economic leaders to coordinate their plans to manage the crisis (13. 11.). Meanwhile, the socialists had two main messages: firstly, that thanks to the cabinet’s appropriate measures – approved by economic experts –, the first phase of the crisis was over in Hungary; secondly, that in the grave situation, the parties have to put aside their differences. Ferenc Gyurcsány called for “new, common” solutions. The true intention with this message was probably to suggest that the Fidesz was deliberately impeding any sort of agreement. A politician of the MSZP went as far as calling the opposition party a “hindrance”, because its leader, Viktor Orbán, did not attend the economic summit (14. 11.). These themes have all come up in October; thus one of the few novelties of the month was Ferenc Gyurcsány’s claim that the government needed to resume reform politics (26. 11.). This time, the cabinet may have an ally for that: a Reform Alliance (Reformszövetség) was founded by nine employer organizations and the former presidents of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, so as to work out a comprehensive reform programme for the following years (28. 11.).
After some early uncertainty in October, the Fidesz stepped up its attacks against the government. The opposition party called it a shame that the country had to ask for the IMF’s credit, in order to prevent the agreement from seeming like the cabinet’s merit. Serious criticism was directed against the government’s management of the crisis – in particular against the aid package for banks, which was greeted with mixed feelings by experts, and in general against the “brutal restrictions”. The Fidesz came up with its own proposals, although usually without details. Their suggestions included a seven-point growth package (13. 11.), cutting the number of state enterprise leaders, and the immediate and radical reduction of the base rate of the National Bank (18. 11.). Viktor Orbán even spoke about the necessity of reforms on one occasion (20. 11.). The cornerstone of the opposition party’s plans was a large-scale tax cut, which was categorically rejected by Ferenc Gyurcsány. The most emphasized message of the Fidesz built on this difference: they claimed that the government was not managing the crisis by the means employed elsewhere in Europe – which happened to be the very means that the opposition party proposed. As the crisis has external origins, it is extremely important which side’s actions seem to be justified by the – perceived or actual – international example. The Fidesz is making conscious efforts to catch up with the government in this field. The strategic interest was less apparent in the party’s other much-repeated messages in November. They demanded that the cabinet disclose the details of the contract with the IMF – which according to the government was already public –; they criticized the abolishment of the 13th month pension (which, in fact, was limited to 80 thousand forints); and they asserted that government PR was taking away too much money in spite of Ferenc Gyurcsány’s earlier promise.
The effects of the conflict between Hungary and Slovakia on party politics were in many ways reminiscent of the first few weeks of the economic crisis. Again, there was a given situation with little room for disagreement between the parties. Again, due to its position, only the cabinet – and Ferenc Gyurcsány, who quickly seized the initiative – had the power to take concrete steps, while the opposition was restricted to deciding to what extent they stood by the Prime Minister. Again, the PM endeavoured to appear a resolute, yet consensus-seeking leader. He called for five-party talks on the conflict with Slovakia (10. and 12. 11.), where he emphasized that Hungarian parties were on a common platform in this issue. He also met the President and the Speaker of the Parliament to discuss the matter (13. 11.). As a great gesture towards the Fidesz, he offered Zsolt Németh, the opposition party’s foreign policy expert to join him on his meeting with Slovak prime minister Robert Fico. The meeting took place in Komárno, and ended with a joint communiqué that avoided all delicate questions (15. 11). It was only then that the Fidesz had the opportunity for stronger criticism of the government: spokesman Péter Szíjjártó indeed claimed that the cabinet was “unable to protect the Hungarian people”. Ferenc Gyurcsány demanded an independent investigation of the incident at the football match in Dunaszerdahely from his Slovak colleague (16. 11.), but Robert Fico is unlikely to satisfy his request. The dearth of tangible results and the uncooperative behaviour of Slovak officials made it clear that this time, the government in Bratislava had the upper hand.
Politicians appeared on the agenda mostly in connection with the economic crisis (Graph 3). However, the list shows that the crisis was a less dominant issue than in the previous month. András Simor is on the list for the first time – the chairman of the Hungarian National Bank informed the public several times on the current state and prospects of the economy, and was present at the announcement of the HUF 600 billion aid package for banks. Ferenc Gyurcsány was less active than in October, but still performed well above his average, for the third month in a row (Graph 4). The same cannot be said about Viktor Orbán – the leader of the opposition had less than half as many appearances as a month ago.
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