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February 2009 - Austerity programs

Political agenda in February 2009 (Weeks 6-9)

February saw the beginning of the spring session of parliament which resulted in an exceptionally eventful political agenda. PM Ferenc Gyurcsány delineated his crisis management package, followed by the Refrom Alliance′s (Reformszövetség) own, more radical proposals. Following two brutal and 'media compatible' murders, the situation of public security and Hungarian gypsies – which in some cases overlap – dominated the agenda for a longer period of time.

In February 2009, the economic crisis continued to be the dominant factor of the political agenda. However, the nature of the discourse was greatly changed by the fact that by that time instead of plans, the debate was about concrete programs. On the opening session of the parliament Ferenc Gyurcsány outlined the governments crisis management package (02. 16), which was followed by the announcement of the more drastic suggestions of the Reform Alliance - which was formed by prominent experts (02. 21.). The SZDSZ and the MDF quickly stood behind the latter, while Fidesz - referring to the European examples - upheld its view that it is impossible to get out of the crisis through austerity measures. The other important issue of the month simultaneously affected public security and the situation of the Hungarian gypsy community. The problems concerning the Hungarian Roma integration are well known, however recently - partly because of the activity of the 'Hungarian Guard' (Magyar Gárda), they have become more and more a part of everyday politics. In February this question came to the center of attention because of two crimes which kicked up dust. Concerning the other events of the month, the MP′s voted twice about the dissolution of the parliament, nevertheless, neither the Fidesz′s proposal, neither the national civil initiative was successful. The SZDSZ started its so called 'tolerance campaign' in which the small party would like to rally voters for the EP elections through accentuating rather its cultural values instead of its economic ones. One case must be mentioned which - in comparison with its importance - did not receive enough attention: János Zuschlag′s confession had practically no mention in politics.

After decreasing for a quarter of the year, the topics favourable for the cabinet once again rose, though it is still not outstanding. (Graph 1.) The increasing performance is a result of the fact, that next to a more intensive crisis management the cabinet could also manifest itself along its own conceptions concerning public security. The topics of the opposition have stagnated at an exceptionaly low rate for more than half a year now, which proves that the influence excersized over the political agenda is not connected directly to the public support of a given political force. Following its October summit the MSZP set a new record concerning the number of appearances during the period. (Graph 2.) The MDF was more active as well, compared to itself, while the Fidesz and the SZDSZ was average. In the case of the biggest opposition party, the constraint, while with the liberal democrats, the possibility is what is lacking for a more influential presence in the political agenda. 

In February the crisis served with an unpleasant surprise almost everyday: disilusioning statistics and predictions followed one another while the Forint′s exhange rate and the Budapest Stock Exchange set negative records time and time again. In this situation the cabinet′s long-awaited action plan was preceeded by exceptionaly great expectations. The wait was heightened by PM Ferenc Gyurcsány, who amongst others promised the 'most comprehensive tax reforms' of the past years. (02.09) In comparison, the program which was outlined at the commencement of the spring session of parliament once again showed that the Prime Minister had to balance carefuly amongst the different expectations and points of views. On one hand he had to harmonize economic rationality with the country′s endurance, on the other hand his own ideas with those that the MSZP would support. This double-restriction inevitably led to the compromise laden program which was introduced on the 16th. It was also certain that the prime minister′s plans would be faced with critique from two - totally opposite - sides. Thus, it can be said, that three sides were formed in Hungarian public life concerning the crisis management. The side represented by the socialist party, referring to the above mentioned tension between the neccessary and the feasible, jousted by the bearable corrections. The economists, however argued, that a greater catastrophe could only be evaded by drastic restrictions. They - followed by the SZDSZ and the MDF - called the cabinet′s crisis management program a small step taken in the right direction. The third camp - principaly the Fidesz - deny the neccessity of any sort of restrictions. Accordingly, the opposition party called Ferenc Gyurcsány′s proposed steps not only 'brutal restictions' but 'the program of hopelessness'. The MSZP on the other hand, emphasized once again, that its rival did not speak of its own ideas, from which, they came to the conclusion that the Fidesz is actually at a loss.

The Reform Alliance′s suggestions strenghtened the camp of those supporting economic rationality which could be seen by the reception of the program. The Fidesz could not support the strict measures even if they did not come from the untrustworthy cabinet but from a group of highly respected proffessionals. The opposition party did not need to change its reasoning: they continued to contrast the 'european way' of crisis management based on tax cuts as opposed to restrictions. From the part of the PM this alternative program means both danger and a possibility at the same time. It makes it evident that the cabinets program was created thrugh a series of compromises. On one hand this could undermine the competent 'crisis manager' image that the MSZP has been trying to construct since October. On the other, through the contrast, it is easier for Ferenc Gyurcsány to argue that he, - wherever he can - is considerate of the nation′s endurance. The Prime Minister called the Reform Alliance′s proposals impressive, but added that their social effects would be 'chilling' (02.21.). On the contrary, the SZDSZ and the MDF stood by the proposed measures one hundred percent. The small parties could hardly have reached such publicity with their own programs than currently with the Reform Alliance′s program. It is also favourable that now they can stand by the reforms without having to implicitly support the cabinet. A smaller 'race' began among the two parties about which one supports the alternative program more. As a result they handed in a proposal for the acceptance of the program to the parliament at the same time (02.27.). In the last week of the month the MDF took a great risk in order to have the upper hand in the field of economics over its rivals: the head of the party Ibolya Dávid asked Lajos Bokros to lead the EP elections list of MDF (02.24.). The former socialist minister of finance is highly recognized by most of the proffession, however, his past and his ideological position split the MDF extremely. The question is what will be the potential balance of the pros and cons of the nomination. 

The situation of Hungarian Romas gained more and more visibility in the past months through the social system and due to several crimes committed by or against Romas. In February two exceptional incidents had ethnic relevance. In Veszprém a well known handball player was stabbed to death by a group consisting of Romas (02. 28.), while in Tatárszentgyörgy a five year old Roma child and his father was shot by unknown perpetrators (02. 23.). Separately and together as well, much was said about public security and Hungarian Romas. Following the incident in Veszprém Ferenc Gyurcsány promised surpluss funding for the police, while the Fidesz proposed the 'three strikes law' in parliament, aimed at the aggravation of the penal law (02. 12.). Besides this the opposition party accused the cabinet of incompetence, saying that public security is 'in shambles' as a result of their actions. The party - in order to avoid the gain of the extreme right - had to react to the fact, that the perpetrators were of Roma origin. Balancing between the needs of the moderate and radical supporters, Viktor Orbán announced that (contrary to Jobbik′s views) there is no such thing as Roma crime, but there are Roma criminals and their numbers are rising (02. 11.). The socialists criticized the head of the opposition vehemently because of this. (02. 14.). After the double-murder in Tatárszentgyörgy, the Romas became the victims. The case held the need for the improvement of public security on the agenda, and alongside it the integration of Romas came into the limelight as well. Ernő Kállai, the ombudsman for minority rights pressed for an ethnic 'peace plan' in his speech in the parliament and called the political elite hypocrites for procrastinating with finding a solution (02. 24.). 

In February, Ferenc Gyurcsány was once again very active. (Graph 3.) The PM represented the position of the MSZP in both questions as well as taking his part in the criticism of the opposition. At the end of the month the Prime Minister went to Brussels with crisis management plans, amongst others a plan for a 180 billion euro stabilization and integration program for Central Europe (03. 01.). Ibolya Dávid′s activity is worth mentionig as well: the leader of the MDF made the news primarily as a result of Lajos Bokros′s nomination. Ferenc Gyurcsány′s performance has been inconsistent in the past months (Graph 4.). The Prime Minister did not set a new record considering the number of his performances in the past cycle, however he approached the October peak. Viktor Orbán′s values continue to stagnate at a low level.


Research methodology

The methodology applied by Vision can be used for the search of political issues considered the most relevant by the media. In our data base we include data considered as leading news by the media - these reach our 'stimulus threshold' - that concern the Hungarian parties and actors and those that were published at least in two places: as leading news on a national television channel; on the first page of a national daily; on the opening page of a leading internet news site. Therefore, we can show what kinds of issues were present on the media agenda in a given period, who benefited from these appearances and which political actors gave their views on them. We do not claim that presence on the media agenda in itself determines the outcome of the political competition, but we presume that these leading issues may influence the agenda of public opinion.