Much of August was part of the silly season, which only ended after the Beijing Olympics. That is when PM Ferenc Gyurcsány published the programme of his minority government titled Agreement. The main aim of the writing was to lay the foundations of further cooperation with ex-coalition partners SZDSZ, but (for now) that did not work. The liberal party rejected the programme and went as far as attacking the Prime Minister himself.
The August agenda had two distinct parts. The first three to four weeks belonged to the silly season that had begun in July – the news, already lacking in political content, were mostly about the Beijing Olympics. Consequently, the eighth month of the year did not have a central theme: although a couple of issues have come up, none of them could gain predominance. In fact, the near-absence of politics made it possible for events that otherwise would have gone unnoticed to reach the agenda. As opposed to the first, longer half of August, its last week was definitely part of the political autumn, leading up to it. Ferenc Gyurcsány published the programme of his minority government, entitled Agreement, leaving the political parties with plenty of ammunition for the weeks, or even months to come (27. 08.). In spite of some prior attention, the programme has only became the main talking point after its publication – less because of its actual content than its rejection by the SZDSZ.
The ratios of both the government and the opposition topics have decreased, to approximately the same extent (Graph 1). That of opposition topics has been following a downward trend since early 2008, and is now nearing the low of August 2007. It is certainly worth mentioning that the government and the opposition topics have only amounted to 40 percent of the news altogether. The last time this has happened was in April 2005. Therefore, it can be concluded that political issues were generally missing for much of the month, and not only the consequential ones – which is typical of the silly season. The big parties were somewhat less active than in July; the difference between them did not change significantly (Graph 2). In turn, the small parties increased their share of the agenda: the SZDSZ to a lesser degree, but, due to the conflicts surrounding Agreement, presumably for a longer time than the MDF, which made the most of the silly season. Besides repeating its usual messages, the conservative party drew notice when vice-chairman Kornél Almássy announced that he would run for the top spot at the party’s internal elections in autumn (08. 08.).
By creating its programme, the socialist minority government endeavoured to live up to diverse expectations. Since the cabinet’s formation in May, a sort of nationwide debate had started – more or less independently of the political elite – about the problems and necessary changes in certain areas of life. Such were the system of social allowances and tax reform, with financial groups coming up with their own ideas (12. 08.). For the MSZP, the emergence of these issues provided a challenge, but also an opportunity to restore to a certain extent their image of a dynamic political force. However, in order to achieve that, they needed precise and well-founded proposals. Besides the professional expectations, the socialists also had to meet some much more obvious political ones, raised by the SZDSZ. The free democrats made their support of the cabinet dependent on its programme; liberal politicians have repeatedly asked for it (06. and 07. 08.), and made suggestions about what it should include – for example, János Kóka demanded a 1000 billion HUF worth tax cut in three years (23. 08.). In addition to these expectations, Ferenc Gyurcsány also had his own political future in mind: he had to prove to the MSZP that he had a viable plan for the rest of the term.
The text of Agreement shows that the programme was designed for more than one audience. Ferenc Gyurcsány makes a clear gesture to the SZDSZ – the most important element of his article is a proposal for just a 1000-1200 billion tax cut in three to four years. On the other hand, it is to the MSZP that the Prime Minister promises not to reduce administrative spending and welfare expenditures. The core of the idea is that the costs of tax reform would be compensated by the additional income gained from fighting underground economy. This would be made possible by an increased cooperation with companies and, more generally, a change in “social culture” (that is, the willingness to pay taxes), a hoped-for consequence of tightening state control (“zero tolerance”). As a result, a so-called “Hungarian model” would evolve, falling somewhere between the Anglo-Saxon and the Scandinavian variants.
Ferenc Gyurcsány’s programme was greeted with skepticism by financial experts – especially the notion that tax cuts would lead to a large-scale whitening of the economy –, and rejected by the other parliamentary parties. It can be concluded that there were no proposals in Agreement that could have diverted either the Fidesz or the SZDSZ from its original strategy. The largest opposition party used the article to attack the government on the usual fronts: vice-chairman Mihály Varga claimed that the material was not well-thought-out, while the tax reform itself was a “simple hoax” (27. 08.). Another charge, targeting – as more and more often lately – the socialists’ economic credibility, was that the writing, published as a supplement of the newspaper Népszabadság, was partly paid for by the MSZP with public funds (26. and 30. 08.). Nonetheless, it is the SZDSZ’s reaction that is likely to have the greater impact on the political autumn in Hungary. The free democrats rejected the Prime Minister’s programme after a few days of pondering: Gábor Fodor declared that Agreement was a lifeline for Ferenc Gyurcsány, and not for the country (30. 08.). The liberal party leader emphasized that besides disagreeing with some of the proposals, their decision had as much to do with credibility concerns. This was a barely veiled hint that the Prime Minister’s person was the main obstacle in the way of reaching a compromise.
Thus at the beginning of autumn, there are two questions that may frame the parties’ manoeuvres for the following period. The first is whether the ex-coalition partners will conclude a real agreement, and if so, what that will comprise. The possibilities range from a negative answer to a renewal of the MSZP-SZDSZ alliance; it is the fate of the 2009 budget that is at stake. The other question is, in connection with this one, whether a situation can occur where Ferenc Gyurcsány has no choice but to leave office. Be that as it may, the Prime Minister held out the prospect of resigning in case the parliament did not pass next year’s budget (27. 08.). In this way, he has basically threatened the liberals with early elections, something they would rather avoid, considering their present unpopularity.
In August, not even the most active politicians had a lot of appearances; the low values on Graph 3 testify that the greater part of the month still belonged to the silly season. The fact that András Cser-Palkovics is on top of the list suggests the same – while he rarely makes it to the first half of the roll, this time, it is the vice-spokesman of the Fidesz who led his party’s sporadic attacks against the government. Ibolya Dávid’s third place may also be attributed to the other politicians’ low-key performance – the chairwoman of the MDF proposed a meeting of opposition parties on the budget and the tax reform (23., 26. and 31. 08.). In this way, she hoped to prove that her party is constructive and test simultaneously in public whether the SZDSZ is truly part of the opposition. Both the Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition had fewer appearances than in July (Graph 4). Ferenc Gyurcsány has only performed worse once in this parliamentary term. On the other hand, by the end of the month, he has regained his activity, and he is most likely to be a protagonist of the autumn’s political struggles. Viktor Orbán was in the news mainly because of his sharp criticism of the Russian military operations in Georgia (14. and 16. 08.).
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