The first month of the autumn term proved to be quite
eventful. The relationship between former coalition partners MSZP and SZDSZ
changed more according to the socialists’ wishes, as – unlike the liberals –
they were able to show unity. In the second half of the month, the shadowing
affair became dominant news, bringing about the clash of the interpretations of
reality of the MSZP and the Fidesz, and the fall of vice-president Kornél
Almássy in small, conservative MDF.
The agenda of September’s first half turned out as expected.
With the beginning of the autumn session in the Parliament, the parties became
more active, behaving according to the strategies they had devised after the
formation of the minority government. In this period, the agenda was determined
primarily by the relationship of the MSZP and the SZDSZ, and – to a lesser
extent – by the Right’s endeavour to put the cabinet under pressure. The premade
scenarios were rewritten by the so-called shadowing affair, which, in the
second half of the month, gradually pushed all the other issues into the
background. The MSZP accused the Fidesz of running a sort of “shadow secret
service”, which did not refrain from using illegal means to serve the
opposition party’s interests. On the other hand, the Fidesz claimed that such
allegations had no foundation, and the governing party was just trying to
discredit its rival. The outcome of this affair is not yet clear; what is
however certain is that it has indirectly ruined Kornél Almássy’s hopes of
becoming chairman of the MDF, and later his very career in the conservative
party. Part of the agenda was the government’s plan for a “Robin Hood tax”, to
be levied on energy firms and used to subsidize increasing district heat
expenditures. In addition, the Hungarian Democratic Charter – meant by its
founders to serve the fight against extremism – was established with the
participation of PM Ferenc Gyurcsány, and held its first rally (06. and 20.
09.).
The ratios of both government and opposition topics have
decreased, to almost the same extent; their present values are extremely low
(Graph 1). This is especially true for their sum, which – well below 40 percent
– is the lowest value that has been recorded since September 2002. By contrast,
the parties themselves did significantly improve their performance (Graph 2).
That of the two smaller parties is particularly notable. The apparent
contradiction between the two graphs can be explained by the fact that although
the parties were quite active, they were unable to turn the issues that came up
to their advantage.
In the first half of the month, the relationship between the
former coalition partners was the leading issue on the agenda. SZDSZ chairman
Gábor Fodor hoped to create an image of independence for his party’s by keeping
a distance from the MSZP, thus he categorically rejected Agreement, the Prime
Minister’s programme, and argued in favour of a “government of experts”, without
Ferenc Gyurcsány. However, the free democrats owe their key position to the possibility
of reaching a consensus with the socialist party, therefore they are not
interested in doing anything that could either preclude or make inevitable an
agreement. Accordingly, the SZDSZ accepted the MSZP’s invitation to “political
talks”, but the meeting ended without any specific results (11. 09.). In the
meanwhile, the socialists attempted to put pressure on the liberal party. They
emphasized that it is for the good of the country that negotiations were needed,
and, by extolling their willingness to work towards a consensus, they shifted
the blame for the potential breakdown of the talks onto the SZDSZ in advance. Their
argument against the idea of a “government of experts” was that they wanted to
discuss policies, not positions. A personal goal of Ferenc Gyurcsány was to
avoid becoming a victim of the agreement. In order to prevent intra-party
commotion behind his back, he proposed an extraordinary congress to choose from
among early elections, the “government of experts” and Agreement (08. 09.). His
step proved to be more or less successful, as the MSZP leadership sided with the
initiative, that is with the Prime Minister himself. It became clear that the socialist
party would stay united this time, which reduced the SZDSZ’s room for
manoeuvre. Partly because of this, partly because of the free democrats’ internal
division, more and more people started to voice their concern over Gábor
Fodor’s political line and the “government of experts”. Ferenc Gegesy, mayor of
Budapest’s 9th district, went as far as resigning from the party, citing its
mistaken decisions (15. 09.). As a result of the criticisms, the SZDSZ’s
behaviour changed noticeably – there was much less talk about the “government
of experts”, and more about the party’s new proposal, the so-called “budget
spending ceiling”, a bill that would set limits to government expenditures. At
the second meeting between Ferenc Gyurcsány and Gábor Fodor, this was the main
topic (23. 09.)
The Fidesz continued to put pressure on the minority
government, so as to create the impression that the cabinet is unstable, thus
unable to perform its duties. According to the largest opposition party, only
early elections could provide a solution to the present situation; it is too
late for a “government of experts”, as proposed by the liberals. The MDF –
uncharacteristically – started the autumn session in the thick of action.
Pointing at the negotiations between the MSZP and the SZDSZ, the Forum again questioned
whether the free democrats were truly an opposition party. Besides testing the
liberals, chairwoman Ibolya Dávid also had in mind to show the MDF’s readiness
to act when she proposed a meeting of opposition parties to discuss tax
changes, and the possibility of dissolving the parliament (03. 09.). The same
reasons prompted the conservative party to submit a motion for the dissolution
of the parliament effective 30th September (11. 09.). The proposal came in
handy for the socialists, who, in this way, could force the SZDSZ to put its
cards on the table at a favourable time, damaging the free democrats’
bargaining positions. The MSZP agreed to speed up the parliamentary debate of
the proposal, so the MPs could vote on it as early as the 15th. In the end, the
motion was rejected by the SZDSZ and failed, leaving Ibolya Dávid with the
opportunity to claim that there were in fact 204 government MPs, including
therefore the liberals. After the parliament’s decision not to dissolve itself,
the Fidesz switched to demanding a debate and a vote on the Agreement
programme.
The events above could broadly be expected – unlike the
so-called shadowing affair. On the 10th, the National Bureau of Investigation
(Nemzeti Nyomozó Iroda) launched an inquiry into a certain UD Property
Protection Ltd. (UD Vagyonvédelmi Zrt.), suspected of having acquired state
secrets. Two days later, Ibolya Dávid accused the same UD Ltd. – based on a
tape she had received – of having spied on her, with the consent and for the
sake of rival Kornél Almássy. A few hours afterwards, Fidesz politician Ervin
Demeter claimed that Secret Services Minister György Szilvásy was attempting to
discredit the opposition party by means reminiscent of the communist era – for
it turned out that the leader of UD Ltd. was a high-ranking official at the
secret services under Viktor Orbán’s right-wing government, until 2002 (12.
09.). From that point, the affair had two – somewhat intertwining – subplots. Kornél Almássy withdrew his candidacy for
chairman of the MDF (13. 09.), thus Ibolya Dávid was re-elected without
opposition (27. 09.). Almássy was then also expelled from the party (26. 09.),
after having stated that he had made his decision under threats, and having
asked his followers not to vote for Ibolya Dávid. This conflict generated a lot
of attention for the Forum, but surely not to its advantage: the internal power
struggle reflected badly on the party, and diverted its efforts from enforcing its
strategic messages.
The other subplot of the affair involved the two big
parties. The MSZP emphasized the relationship between UD Ltd. and the Fidesz,
insinuating that the opposition party could use it to gain political advantages
by illegal means. György Szilvásy declared that the former secret services
ministers of the Fidesz administration – László Kövér and Ervin Demeter – had
regularly met with the “shadow secret service”, and had even given tasks to the
company (23. 09.). The two politicians did not deny the connection itself, but maintained
that they had not done anything illegal. To prove their point, they replayed
the tapes concerning the affair, formerly provided to the National Security
Committee by György Szilvásy (25. 09.). In the Fidesz’s interpretation, the
government is using the secret services against its rival, because otherwise,
it would be unable to stay in power. As part of the counter-offensive, the
cabinet was sharply criticized by the opposition party for the alleged tapping
of its politicians. Overall, it can be said that a struggle between two
diametrically opposing interpretations – each rooted in the political messages
of the past years – has begun, fuelled by a lack of decisive proofs. The future
of the shadowing affair is not yet clear: it may shift the present balance of
power, but may as well sink into oblivion, like so many of its predecessors.
On the list of politicians who have appeared on the agenda,
only the positions of Ibolya Dávid and Gábor Fodor could be surprising, but in
the light of the events of the last few weeks, they are not (Graph 3). Ferenc
Gyurcsány had an exceptionally busy month – the Prime Minister has not been so
active for two years (Graph 4). Moreover, he achieved this result without
playing a role in the shadowing affair. On the whole, the Prime Minister grew
stronger in September, meaning that the chances of his being replaced against
his will have decreased significantly. Viktor Orbán was much less active, in
spite of the crowded month – the leader of the opposition contributed to the
agenda when criticizing the secret services in connection with the Left’s
attack on the Fidesz.
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